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ABSTRACT 
Methane issuing from a roof-bolt hole ignited when the hot bit was withdrawn. Similar ignitions have occurred in 
other mines. This one differed in that flames spread quickly, coal was ignited, and, after three futile hours of 
applying inadequate water and extinguishing agents, the mine was sealed. 
Fires are fuel and ventilation controlled. In this mine there was an abundance of methane, coal, and wood 
lagging. Recovery of the mine, therefore, depended on successful control of its ventilation. The recovery was done 
without anyone suffering a scratch; a remarkable feat considering the abnormal methane outflows and concentra-
tions, the continuing evidence of on-going thermal reactions, and what once were inexperienced but now amongst 
the best mine rescuemen. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Minas V is one of six mines in and around Palua, 
Mexico, owned by AHMSA, the largest steel producer 
and mine operator in Mexico. Palau, in the desert in the 
eastern foothills of the Sierra Madre, is best reached by 
a 5-hour drive south of San Antonio, Texas as shown in 
Figure 1 at the end of this paper. 
Minas V is key to the future of the Palau district; it 
was the company's primary reserve for high-quality 
metallurgical coal. 
The mine (Figure 1) was opened by two slopes, one 
the main intake, the other a combined belt entry with a 
man-supply hoist. The fan on the shaft to the right of the 
slopes was a Joy M-96-50- 1200. The 7-entry mains 
(C. Gral Sur) had been driven 300 meters from the slope 
bottom. No. 1 Oriente, the future tailgate, was 530 meters 
long; No.2 Oriente, the future headgate, had been driven 
450 meters. (Figure 2 at the end of this paper). 
The fire began at the face of the number 3 entry in 
the C. Oral Sur. Within three hours it spread to the Nos. 
1 and 5 entries and into No. 2 Oriente. The miners with-
drew; and, the shaft and portals were sealed. 
THE FIRE 
The following summarizes key actions leading to the 
recovery of Minerales Monclova Mina V (MMMV). 
Where appropriate, the why's and wherefore's of those 
actions are discussed. 
11 May- The General Manager, Ing. Lorenzo Uscanga 
and Carl Pelastro0 ) called detailing the fire in and seal-
ing of Minerales Monclova Mina V (MMMV). 
15 May - Ing. Uscanga and the Safety Director, 
Armando Diaz, came to Birmingham, AL. Among the 
critical actions discussed were where boreholes would 
have to be drilled, other key mine-atmosphere sampling 
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points, sampling procedures, and the need to train and 
equip Minas V and Micare<2) miners 
6 June - Stevenson and Mitchell went to MMMV, ex-
amined the site, and discussed conditions and possible 
actions with Don McBride<3), management, and engi-
neers. We detailed the mine-atmosphere sampling tech-
niques and procedures we wanted; and, fmalized arrange-
ments to have syringe gas samples sent to Precision Gas 
Testing's Brookwood, Alabama laboratory pending 
transfer of their equipment to MMMV. 
14 June -A preliminary mine recovery plan was sent to 
MMMV for review and comments. 
In its preparation, we were of the opinion that 
recovery was contingent on having: 
1. At least six, well-trained and well-equipped mine 
rescue teams with henchmen and fresh-air 
basemen<4). 
2. On-site, 24-hour/day analysis of atmospheres from 
specific locations within the mine. 
3. Oxygen concentrations maintained below 2%; and, 
4. Positive trends in the ratios CO/C02 and H/CH4• 
That plan was based on the air-lock method of re-
covery. This method was needed to militate against 
reignition of smoldering coals and wood with the high 
probability for igniting methane. It also was essential 
for optimizing the recovery of the inclines, particularly 
with the potential for lightening strikes igniting meth-
ane in the mine<5). 
22 June-3 July - The Illinois Department of Natural 
Resources, informed us that Don McBride had to return 
to his Benton, Illinois post. Following intensive inter-
views of persons with the proven experience and com-
petence to continue McBride's work, we recommended 
that MMMV hire Patrick Graham<6). 
17 July - Ing. Uscanga and Minas V Manager, Jose 
Franco met with us to discuss the status of the recovery 
and their concerns with the plan. Prior to this, we had 
discussed the plan with mine-rescue people in the United 
States, all of whom had many years experience in mine-
fire fighting and mine recovery. Without exception, they 
were concerned with the safety of even the most experi-
enced mine-rescue teams while traveling down, air-lock-
ing, and reventilating the inclines and shaft bottom given: 
1. The 3 to 5 inches of water gage methane-induced 
pressure on the incline and shaft seals; and, 
2. The essentiality of constructing better-than-good seals 
by teams wearing self-contained breathing apparatus 
while working on ladders in their efforts to seal their-
regular roof and cavities above lagged arches in -16°, 
wet, slippery, -920-meter-long inclines having a cross-
section like this: 
t 
V) 
t': ('f')l4-----f'---_____ ___. 
19 July- The new recovery plan was based on flooding 
the area in which fire might have propagated and in 
which rekindling was highly probable. The rationale 
for this is discussed later. 
27-28 July- Mitchell went to the mine to review the 
mine-rescue team training, and to discuss the flooding 
option with mine engineers and management. 
1 August- The final draft-recovery plan was submitted 
based on the previous discussions at the mine and again 
with experienced mine-rescue people in the United 
States. It detailed: 
Phase I: Injecting water through Borehole 2 to the 104-
elevation "shoreline"<7). Its goals were to: 
a) Quench on-going thermal reactions (e.g., smolder-
ing or hot materials); 
b) Establish "explosion-proof' seals in by C. 1 Oriente; 
c) Have at least 100 inches of water pressure against 
methane liberation from C. 2 Oriente and the C. Oral 
Sur entries in by; and, 
d) Force chemical reactions<8) that would make us 
aware of on-going thermal reactions in areas through 
which water flows, their extent and seriousness, thus 
aiding in subsequent decisions. 
This plan also discussed the efforts needed to re-
cover: 1) Inclines A and B; 2) the Shaft bottom; 3) the 
Shaft; 4) C. Gral Sur entries to and C. 1 Oriente; and, 
5) the remainder of the mine. 
In preparing this plan, we knew water might 
damage the mine roof and bottom. We also knew 
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that was, at best, a possibility. The probability was that with-
out flooding and without the ability to supplement operations 
with nitrogen injection, should the need arise, recovery was 
too dangerous to consider based on our knowledge (really 
our lack thereof) regarding on-going thermal reactions. We 
discussed this, as follows, in our note of 18 August to man-
agement: 
Some Minerales Monclova officials are concerned water 
might cause serious damage in flooded entries. They pon-
dered whether the shoreline should be lower than the 104-
meter (above sea level) given in our 30 July-recovery plan. 
Their concerns are valid; and, normally, I would agree. 
Unfortunately, conditions in Mine Mimosa V are not nor-
mal. In fact, the argument could be that a higher level is 
more appropriate. It was recognition of these conditions that 
caused us to modify the 19 July-plan. What are or were those 
conditions? 
1. Hot carbons<9l (probably smoldering coals and, perhaps, 
wood) reacted with the water being injected during the 
last week of July and the first week of August. Purport-
edly, the shoreline during that period was at 95 to 98 m., 
placing those carbons between Borehole 2 and C. 2 
Orie_nte. This is supported by comparison of the graphs 
for H2 from Boreholes 1 and 2 samples, considering the 
impact of the methane outflows from C. 2 Oriente and 
the C. Gral Sur faces00l. 
2. Prior to sealing, temperatures in the Shaft were purport-
edly 1350°C. It is prudent, therefore, to suspect hot car-
bons at elevations as high as 107m. Should oxygen con-
centrations rise above 12 percent where such hot car-
bons are present, ignition of the inby as well as sur-
rounding bodies of methane could lead to a series of dev-
astating explosions<11>. The damage from these would 
likely be the cause for far greater, irrecoverable damage 
to the mine (e.g., destruction of the Shaft and Inclines as 
well as entries) than could be caused by flooding. 
3. Methane liberations from C. 2 Oriente and the C. Gral 
Sur faces are the major source for the methane-induced 
pressures against the Incline and Shaft seals. Someone 
else may, but I do not know how those seals and how 
debris in those openings can be removed safely unless 
those pressures are reduced to below that needed to inert 
the atmospheres immediately inby. It was for that reason 
I selected bringing the water to the 1 04-shoreline02>. As 
an added bonus, with this shoreline we should have 
formed "explosion-proof' seals across C. 2 Oriente and 
the C. Gral Sur faces. 
4-7 September- Final preparations were made to breach the 
incline seals. Precision Gas Testing's mobile lab was set up 
at the mine. 
7-12 September- With methane-induced pressures almost 
zero, the B" and later the "'A" Incline seals were breached. 
The teams traveled to the No. 3 crosscut (X/C). Basically, 
the procedures involved, first airlocking, and then ventilat-
ing. 
12 September- Shortly after 1615 hours, frre engulfed the 
main fan house<14>. The inclines were plugged with dirt. The 
frre was extinguished by 2330 hours. 
15 September- The dirt plugs were removed, and teams ex-
plored the remainder of the inclines to the bottom of Tiro Ver-
tical (the main shaft). The accessible C .. Oral Sur entries were 
sealed; Tiro Vertical was uncovered completing Phase 2. 
22 September - With two auxiliary fans blowing into "A", 
'controls were placed in the inclines to ventilate the Shaft bot-
tom and force air up Tiro. This completed Phase 3. The ex-
haust air flowing from Tiro became a continuous sampling 
point to monitor gases being liberated from unexplored areas 
in C. Oral Sur. 
25 September- Water was pumped low enough to permit the 
teams to explore to the faces of C. 1 Oriente. The C. Gral Sur 
entries inby C. 1 Oriente were sealed. A 72-inch-diameter fan 
was installed in the mouth of "A" Inclinado in the exhausting 
configuration. Tiro Vertical was reversed, making it an in-
take. This completed Phase 4. 
Dewatering to bring the "shoreline" to the 1 00-elevation 
was begun. This enabled everyone to get a much needed rest, 
though the teams monitored the mine atmospheres in con-
junction with the lowering "shoreline". 
13 November- The teams resumed their advance up C. Oral 
Sur. Our major concerns were the chance of rekindling in the 
return entries and in the overcasts just in by C. 2 because the 
source(s) for the increasing CO/C02 trend had not be found. 
To militate against rekindling, advancing airlocks were con-
structed on the left side of C. Gral Sur and seals were built at 
the "shoreline" in the other entries. During this, and prior 
steps, roof was reinforced where necessary; dewatering pumps 
were brought up to the "shoreline"; and, the fresh-air base 
was advanced. 
17 November- The main fan on Tiro Vertical began exhaust-
ing; the fan in the mouth of "A" Inclinado was removed; and, 
the inclines were again the primary intakes. 
24 November through 2 December- The teams advanced C. 
Gral Sur to C. 2 Oriente, and sealed inby the C. 2 Oriente 
overcasts. As the teams progressed into and past the third cross-
cut in C. 2 Oriente evidence of frre faded .. Rock falls pre-
vented further exploration. Fortunately, gases flowing from 
C. 2 indicated no serious thermal activities were likely in C. 2 
(that is, the chance hot materials were inby was negligible). 
This completed our work on the recovery of MMMV. 
As stated at the beginning, this recovery was done without 
anyone suffering a scratch; a remarkable feat considering the 
abnormal methane outflows and concentrations, the continu-
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ing evidence of on-going thermal reactions, and what once 1000 ========---:-:-:-:==---------------. 
were inexperienced but now amongst the best mine rescuemen. 
APPENDIX 
Analysis of Gases 
Analysis of the gases sampled in boreholes 1 and 2 indi-
cated: 
a) Thermal reactions between water and heated carbons 
occurred between July 23 and August 5. 
b) These were outby BH2 
c) They had been quenched. 
d) We could not determine whether thermal reactions were 
on-going in other areas. If there were, and the oxygen 
concentration rose above 12% in their vicinity, an explo-
sion could occur. And, 
e) Most important, there was no on-going frre. 
These findings were based on data in graphs such as those 
that follow. The first five diagrams illustrate definite relation-
ships between methane (CH4) and hydrogen (H4). 
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BOREHOLE 1 August '98 
0 
i 
When thermal reactions are not obvious, the curves and 
trends for one are basically the same as the other. When ther-
mal reactions occur, note, if you will, the hydrogen "erup-
tions". 
This same relationship existed among H2 and the oxides 
of carbon (CO and C02). 
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BORE HOLE 1 June •ga 
Equally important is the relationship between air (prima-
rily nitrogen and oxygen) and CH4; that is, when there was an 
increase in the concentrations of N2 and 0 2 there was a com-
mensurate decrease in CH4 as shown in the graph that fol-
lows. 
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These N -0 data showed neither consumption nor ab-
, 2 • 
sorption of oxygen, clear evidence of no on-gomg frres de-
spite the presence of heated carbons. While water was being 
pumped into and later out of the mine, we and mine manage-
ment carefully followed these trends, watching, in particular, 
for even the slightest evidence of an abnormal change in the 
relationships among hydrogen and the other gases or a sus-
tained increase in either the CO/C02 or in the N/02 ratios. 
Such evidence would lead to immediate reevaluation of what 
was being done. 
Footnotes: 
1. Carl Pelastro is a Pacific Corp. engineer and an outstand-
ing mine-rescue person. 
2. Open pit mines outside Piedro Negras owned by 
Minerales Monclova. 
3. Don McBride is a senior member of the Office of Mines 
and Minerals in the illinois Dept. of Natural Resources. 
He is also one of the leading mine-rescue persons in the 
United States. He developed and initiated the mine-res-
cue training and equipment programs at MMMV. 
4. Prior to this, we had lengthy discussions with various 
people regarding their availability to train mine rescue 
teams should Illinois officials not permit Don McBride 
to remain. 
5. The ignition of in-mine methane-air bodies by lighten-
ing strikes propagating into the mine has become a mat-
ter of great concern based on these being the source for 
explosions in the Mary Lee, Oak Grove, Pinnacle, and 
Quinland mines. 
6. Pat Graham arrived at MMMV on 16 July. By 20 Au-
gust, he was satisfied with the competence of the 
henchmen, fresh-air basemen, the Mimosa and Micare 
team members, and the equipment. Graham, Stevenson, 
and I are awed by the outstanding work done by those 
teams. Never, in my 50 years in mine recovery, have I 
experienced greater dedication than given by them. More 
important, despite extreme hardships and difficult tasks 
not even a single scratch was suffered. A detailed report 
of the training and subsequent recovery operations is 
available for interested persons. 
7. Water might cause damage to the mine roof and bottom. 
That is a possibility; recovery without the use of water is 
too dangerous to consider based on our present knowl-
edge or lack thereof regarding on-going thennal reac-
tions. 
8. The reaction between a slow flow of water into smolder-
ing carbon-based materials, such as coal and wood, should 
generate hydrogen (H2), carbon dioxide (C02), and car~ 
bon monoxide (CO). 
9. · Once ignited, coal and wood will continue to issue flames 
in oxygen concentrations as low as 5%; at lower concentra-
tions - including 0% - they will smolder and even glow until 
being consumed. The sole advantages of< 5% 0 2 are that the 
hot carbons are not likely to propagate much beyond their loca-
tion and combustibles such as methane cannot be ignited. 
10. This is detailed later in the section Analysis of May- 12August 
1998 Gas Data. 
11. Methane (5- 15% in air) will be ignited by sources hav-
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ing temperatures> 5,360°C. Once ignited, flame tem-
peratures will rise to -1 ,300°C, and combustible limits 
will ·spread to -0.5--21%. The resulting heat will cause 
negative as well as positive pressure zones to develop. 
Should there be a source of air, the air will be drawn into 
the negative-pressure zones, diluting the methane con-
tained therein, and extending flames with the develop-
ment of secondary, tertiary, .... explosions. The explo-
sions in the No. 9 Mine (1968, Farmington, WV) were 
but one of many examples of this. 
12. Floor elevations at the mouth of C. 2 Oriente range from 
100.73 to 101.06. These openings are purportedly 2.7-
m-high. 
13. The lab consisted of a computer-controlled Hewlitt-
Packard 6890 Gas Chromatograph, two other separate 
detectors, and support equipment. 
The cause for this fire is not known; it was initiated in 
the fan house. 
Enlarged Area 
Figure 1. Location of Minerales Monclova Minas V. 
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Figure 2. Map and identification of Locations Minerales Monclova Minas Mimosa V. 
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Figure 3. Minerales Monclova Mina Mimosa V- Initial Mine Ventilation. 
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